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Vade Mecum for the Next Enlargements 
of the European Union 
Michael Emerson 
 
The European Council meeting on 16-17 December 
took many decisions that will set the course for the 
European Union’s continuing enlargement 
process. These decisions concern in the first place 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey, but they 
also contain some pointers for the nature of the 
process ahead that will concern other possible 
candidates, from the Balkans to Ukraine. New 
language and concepts have been introduced.  
Bulgaria and Romania received almost 
identical treatment. For both it was 
acknowledged that the formal negotiations had 
been completed on 14 December 2004, that the 
Treaties of Accession should be signed in April 
2005, and that full accession would take place in 
January 2007. 
However, there are still some ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. 
The decisions assume explicitly that reform 
efforts will be continued, especially in the area 
of justice and home affairs for both candidates, 
and also in the areas of competition and 
environment policies for Romania.  
More generally, for both Bulgaria and Romania 
…  
“safeguard clauses will provide for measures 
to address serious problems that may arise 
before accession or in the three years after 
accession.” 
In practice this means that for domains such as 
the internal market and justice and home affairs 
the EU would be able to take protective measures 
if the acceding state does not fully implement its 
obligations. This does not amount to very much. 
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More importantly, it is widely considered that Romania has 
been treated leniently with regard to the political 
Copenhagen criteria, and that serious weaknesses in the 
quality of public governance, which gave rise to critical 
reports from the European Parliament over the last year, 
have hardly been made good in a matter of months. The 
Romanian case will no doubt be cited in future by other 
candidate states with relatively weak standards of public 
governance, for example from the Balkans, with the 
argument “we are up to Romanian standards, are we not?”. 
Others may say that the bar has been lowered. Nonetheless 
the very recent presidential election can be considered to be 
to Romania’s credit. Although criticisms of electoral fraud 
in the first round were quite serious, in the second round on 
12 December the opposition candidate – Traian Basescu, 
the mayor of Bucharest – achieved a surprising victory, 
which was immediately and elegantly recognized by the 
outgoing President Ion Iliescu. A smooth and democratic 
transfer of power to the opposition, an acid test for new 
democracies, has been fairly accomplished. 
Croatia got the date of 17 March 2005 for the opening of 
negotiations, but on the very explicit condition that it will 
… 
“take the necessary steps for full cooperation with 
the ICTY and … that the remaining indictee must be 
located and transferred to the Hague as soon as 
possible.” 
The remaining indictee is General Gotovina, wanted for 
war crimes. He is surely the most wanted man in Croatia 
and also one of its best-known faces. But is he actually in 
Croatia, within the jurisdiction of the Croatian government? 
There are rumours that he is in France, where his residence 
may be facilitated by the report I have heard from 
unofficial Croatian journalistic sources that he also has a 
French passport and citizenship, due to his service in earlier 
years in the French Foreign Legion. If this is the case, 
perhaps France could take over the dossier. 
Turkey was the major agenda item. The session turned out 
to be one of the European Council’s classic cliff-hangers. 
At the outset of the meeting the preferred positions still 
diverged considerably among the member states and 
between the EU and Turkey. Continuous negotiation had 
been going on for at least a month beforehand, with drafts 
of the Presidency’s conclusions being revised many times.  
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The most important point for Turkey is that it got a date – 3 
October 2005 – for the opening of accession negotiations. 
France in particular had sought delay until its May 2005 
referendum on the European Constitution would be well 
passed.  
But the opening of negotiations is still subject to conditions 
to be fulfilled before then. The European Council had 
judged that Turkey “sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen 
criteria” to open accession negotiations, provided that it 
brings into force six specific pieces of legislation, which 
are: 
1.  the law on associations 
2.  the new penal code 
3.  the law on intermediate courts of appeal 
4.  the code on criminal procedure 
5.  legislation to establish the judicial police 
6.  the law on execution of punishments 
The other pre-condition concerns Cyprus, which brought 
the negotiations with Prime Minister Erdogan close to 
breakdown on 17 December. The EU sought Turkey’s 
agreement to sign a Protocol concerning extension of the 
existing EU-Turkish customs union to the new member 
states, including of course the Republic of Cyprus. This 
would amount to implicit recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus, which Turkey has refused to do in the absence of 
an agreement for re-unifying the island. The outcome was 
that: 
“the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to 
sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara 
Agreement prior to the actual start of accession 
negotiations … ”.   
But there is a lot more small print in the European Council 
conclusions, which sets out possible conditions for the 
conclusion of the negotiations, and which are bound to 
surface in due course as and when the negotiations reach an 
advanced stage. All of these conditions are reflecting either 
the unease in public opinion in several member states over 
the prospect of admitting such a big and different country, 
or their outright opposition in some cases such as Austria. 
These conditions may be grouped under three headings: 
•  Conditions for possible suspension of negotiations 
•  Conditions for transitional arrangements or derogations 
after accession 
•  Conditions for alternative solutions if the negotiations 
fail. 
The suspension clause could be activated by the Council 
acting by qualified majority decision in the event of a 
serious and persistent breach of the principles of 
democracy, human rights, fundamental freedom and the 
rule of law. This clause may be considered to be hardly 
controversial or unreasonable. 
The transitional and derogation material is far more 
questionable, both legally and politically. This long 
paragraph is therefore quoted here in full: 
“Long transition periods, derogations, specific 
arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. 
clauses which are permanently available as a basis 
for safeguard measures, may be considered. The 
Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its 
proposals for each framework, for areas such as 
freedom of movement, structural policies or 
agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking 
process regarding the eventual establishment of 
freedom of movement of persons should allow for a 
maximum role of individual Member States. 
Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be 
reviewed regarding their impact on competition or 
the functioning of the internal market”.   
These provisions amount to the member states having 
decided to insert a considerable Trojan horse behind the 
defences of the EU’s own law and political principles that 
guarantee equality of all member states. It has been a key 
item of EU doctrine in accession negotiations up until now 
that there should be no permanent derogations from EU 
law, and no opting out provisions for new member states. 
Of course the European Council is here deciding nothing, 
only that such matters ‘may be considered’. A benign 
interpretation is that these are mere political precautions 
that are necessary today to reassure public opinion in the 
EU that is anxious about an uncertain future. For example 
for the movement of persons it is possible that Turkey will 
tend to follow the Spanish model, namely that of a country 
that experienced a long period of structural emigration, but 
saw this cease and even go into reverse as a result of the 
rising prosperity associated with EU accession. Moreover 
the demographics of the EU over the next decades are 
going to make the case for immigration stronger. In any 
case the time horizon for decisions over permanent 
safeguards are a long way off, if one assumes a ten year 
period from now to accession and another ten to fifteen 
years of transitional arrangements of the kind agreed with 
previous newly acceding states.  
Less benign, it appears that the door is opened politically 
by the EU for the rightly dreaded ‘second-class 
membership’. This seems to be the implication of the 
language about the possibility of special provisions 
(transitions, derogations, safeguards etc.) for the movement 
of persons, the structural funds and agriculture. In spite of 
the dubious legality of such ideas, the language of 
‘permanent safeguard clauses’ was retained. Moreover 
current EU policies for the new member states require 
transitional periods and conditions for full accession to the 
Schengen and Euro areas until years after accession (these 
are asymmetric arrangements in the sense that the new 
member state has no opt-out option, but its admission to 
Schengen and Euro areas is still conditional and subject to 
fresh decisions by the full members years after accession of 
the newcomer).  
This leads on indeed to the question of alternative 
solutions, should negotiations fail. Again the text needs to 
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“The shared objective of the negotiations is 
accession. These negotiations are an open-ended 
process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed 
beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen 
criteria, if the Candidate States is not in a position to 
assume in full all the obligations of membership it 
must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned 
is fully anchored in the European structures through 
the strongest possible bond”. 
For the text to say that the process is open-ended, without a 
guaranteed outcome, is obviously true to the point of being 
banal. However the remaining text is less banal. It seems to 
be the result of negotiations between member states in the 
European Council over what some parties are calling the 
‘privileged partnership’ alternative to full membership. If 
the European Council had retained this language explicitly, 
it would almost certainly have meant their crossing a red 
line for Prime Minister Erdogan. The text avoids mention 
of different preferences of various member states, with 
Austria for example openly advocating the privileged 
partnership idea. It only raises the hypothesis that Turkey 
might not full respect all the Copenhagen criteria, in which 
unfortunate case there should still be devised a highly 
positive outcome. Discounting the obviously diplomatic 
ambiguity of the drafting, the text seems to be inviting 
reflection on alternative outcomes. 
Overall for Turkey this result is surely a case of the glass 
that is either half full or half empty. This reflects some 
basic realities. For Turkey’s full accession to come about, 
in say a decade’s time, several things have to happen. The 
maturing of Turkey’s readiness has to happen, from the 
mindsets of the elite down to grass root level. Perceptions 
in the EU have to change too, both of Turkey as candidate 
state, and of the EU’s own capacity to function 
institutionally at the level of 30 or more member states, and 
of society within in EU member states in relation to 
multiculturalism and immigration. 
Ukraine was also subject of a declaration by the European 
Council. Complements were paid to the Ukrainian leaders 
and people for peaceful resolution to the political crisis. 
The European Council went on to choose carefully its 
language on what could lie ahead. This came just a few 
days after Mr Yushchenko had sketched his European 
vision, in four stages: first to achieve recognition of market 
economy status, second to accede to the WTO, third to 
become associate member of the EU, and fourth in the long 
run to become full member state.  
The European Council for its part did not go beyond the 
phraseology of ‘key neighbour and partner’, looking 
forward to making full use of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Action Plan for Ukraine recently adopted by 
the Commission. Yet in an attempt to open the way for 
something new and positive after the 26 December re-run 
of the Presidential election, it invited Mr Solana to come up 
with concrete proposals to strengthen cooperation with 
Ukraine. The EU leaders were no doubt relieved that they 
can wait for the 26 December elections and then formation 
of a new government before having to respond more 
substantively to the ‘orange revolution’. EU discourse 
seems to have shifted a bit in the wake of the orange 
revolution. While earlier there freely flowed explicitly 
negative remarks about the new neighbours having no 
membership perspectives, now the discourse seems to be 
cutting out the negatives, saying that while accession is not 
on the agenda, no doors are closed for the future.  In the 
meantime the conditions now set for negotiations with 
Turkey lay out some markers for those in Ukraine who 
seriously wish to develop a European Union perspective.   
The coincidence in timing and form between the Ukrainian 
and Romanian presidential elections has been striking. 
Maybe a critical margin of Romanian voters were to a 
degree inspired by the achievements of Yushchenko’s 
supporters in Kiev. Indeed maybe there is going be a new 
domino game of regime change underway, after the 
Georgian rose and Ukrainian orange revolutions. Europe 
does tend to do this from time to time – 1848, 1989-91 etc. 
Who might be next? Maybe Armenia or Moldova, both of 
whom are making more explicit their European aspirations, 
before Russia or Belarus whose leaderships look the other 
way. Mr Saakashvili, writing in the Financial Times on 20 
December, senses a third wave of democratic liberation in 
Europe: 
“The call initiated by Georgia’s Rose Revolution 
and multiplied by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution will 
spread – as demonstrators chanted in Kiev, freedom 
cannot be stopped. Today, events are unfolding 
rapidly. … Reforms can be expected throughout the 
whole post-Soviet space and they will lead to the 
completion of the third and final wave of European 
liberation”.    
This is the scenario that is one and the same time the 
European Union’s dream and nightmare. The EU is 
constantly trying to organize alternatives to full 
membership for its neighbours, ever since Jacques Delors 
offered the European Economic Area to the EFTA states, 
which failed to satisfy. The EU tried not to recognize the 
three Baltic states’ aspirations for EU membership some 
ten years ago, but this became a brilliantly successful 
‘failure’. The European Neighbourhood Policy follows in 
this line. Now the European Council hints at the alternative 
for candidate states to be ‘fully anchored in the European 
structures though the strongest possible bond’. The plot 
may further thicken if the UK fails to ratify the 
Constitution. A still enlarging European Union, yet one 
with increasingly finely graduated frontiers both inside and 
outside, seems to be on the horizon for decades to come.     
  
C  E 
P  S 
 
CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN 
POLICY 
STUDIES 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
www.ceps.be ▪ info@ceps.be 
 
W
e
b
s
i
t
e
:
 
w
w
w
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
B
o
o
k
s
h
o
p
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
s
h
o
p
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
About Stratagen 
Strategic Agenda for the Greater European Neighbourhood 
A Programme of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), for 2005-2010 
 
Stratagen mission statement 
•  To define a vision for a Wider European order and the relationship between the enlarged EU 
and its Arab/Muslim neighbourhood; 
•  To develop these proposals in-depth and in policy-operational terms;  
•  To combine in-house research capacity with networks of individuals from leading research 
institutes in the EU and the neighbourhood, and to disseminate and advocate proposals 
throughout the region; 
•  To work independently from the EU institutions but in close interaction with them; and 
•  To decide on the sequencing and selection of priority topics with core stakeholders. 
The Stratagen programme is organised under the following broad geographic areas: 
•  Northern neighbourhood policy, covering CIS states targeted by EU neighbourhood policy 
•  EU-Russian relations 
•  Southern neighbourhood policy, covering Mediterranean states, but reaching also into what is 
now officially called the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) 
•  Implications for transatlantic relations will be considered for all three regions above. 
The analytical methodology will be multi-disciplinary: political science, international relations and 
European studies, economics and law.   
The programme is led by Michael Emerson, CEPS Senior Research Fellow, together with Daniel 
Gros, CEPS Director. CEPS gratefully acknowledges financial support for the Stratagen
programme from the Open Society Institute and the Compagnia di San Paolo. 